This chapter continues the narrative of Joshua Humphreys and the construction of the original frigates of the embryonic Unites States Navy. It focuses on the relationship between Humphreys and the first Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Stoddert. And, it also connects the birth of the Navy with two factors: foreign events, the continued conflict between Britain and France and Algerine attacks on American shipping and domestic American politics, the rise of the Republican Party and its enmity for a deep-water navy. The same two factors that have very much provided the parameters for the Navy throughout its history, from its origins described here, to today, in the twenty-first century.
Launching the Frigates
During the summer of 1797, the unfinished hull of the newly launched frigate U.S. United States floated in the Delaware River, just south of the city, under the protection of Fort Mifflin. The bottom of the ship had been coppered, but the ship lacked guns, spars, sails, rigging, a crew, and provisions. The combination of the genial but abysmally incompetent Secretary of War, James McHenry, and an unconvinced and penurious Congress failed to appropriate the estimated $125,000 needed annually to provision and man a major eighteenth century warship. In Baltimore, the September 7th launch of the Constellation proceeded without difficulty, but near disaster marked the launch of the Constitution.
As workers knocked away the wedges and shoring of the Boston-built ship, the commander ordered the securing cables cut. Nothing happened. The ship didn’t move. The shipbuilder had failed to build a launch-way at a steep enough incline. This bungled launch left the Constitution in a precarious and potentially dangerous position. If the unsupported hull toppled, great damage might have occurred. If the sixteen hundred ton hulk had careened onto its side, no machinery existing in an American shipyard in 1797 could have uprighted it. Shipwrights would have had to disassemble large portions of the ship before workers and teams of horses or oxen could drag the remaining hull back onto the blocks. Fortunately, the ship sat in the bungled-launch position for a month while ship carpenters reconstructed the way. The second launch on October 21, 1797 proved marginally more successful. This time the ship slid down the rebuilt ramp so quickly that the ship grounded in the mud of Boston harbor awaiting a peak tide to float the thankfully undamaged ship free.
While shipbuilders in Boston and Baltimore launched the Constitution and the Constellation, the unmanned and unrigged United States sat idly anchored in the Delaware River. Just when things seemed to be as bad as they could get, they got worse. The terrifying and virulent Yellow Fever that had first stuck Philadelphia in 1793, struck again. Joshua Humphreys left his yard in Southwark and removed his household to the family home in Haverford. Many other wealthy people fled, and Congress and the rest of the new federal government relocated upriver to plague-free and idyllic Trenton, New Jersey. Secretary of War, James McHenry simply fled. In a vain attempt to protect the ship and its skeleton crew, Captain Barry had the United States towed out of the dock and anchored north of the city at Kensington. Then, Barry also retreated to his estate at Strawberry Hill. For the mariners and shipyard workers, who could not afford to leave and had no place to go, there was no escape or relief. The epidemic was especially intense in the congested wards closest to the river and the port. Humphreys reported a great “number of deaths in the vicinity of the yard.” In 1797 a prolonged period of hot weather carried the fever season into late October. An estimated five thousand people had died in the 1793 Epidemic. Although there are no records for the outbreak in 1797, the number of fatalities must have been high. We can easily imagine the devastation in the alleys and warrens of Southwark among the poorest of the city’s poor: children to be buried; widowers left to cope with a family of young children, and widows deprived of both a husband and a source of income. In the Census of 1800, nearly 10% of the households enumerated in this district were headed by widows now thrown onto charity or their own meager resources. Ironically, the 1797 epidemic was the last major recurrence of the disease. Yet, while the newly built frigates floated in maritime limbo, two events, one domestic and one foreign soon provided the ships, Joshua Humphreys, and the about-to-be-born United States Navy with an opportunity to prove their mettle.
The Election of 1796 demonstrated the volatile divisiness of the newly emerging political consciousness of the American electorate. In a bitterly contested election, Federalist John Adams barely defeated Thomas Jefferson, the Republican candidate. Jefferson, however, had carried Philadelphia, formerly a Federalist bastion, by a 1733 to 1091 vote margin. In Congress, the Federalists retained an unstable three or four vote majority that enabled them to pass any significant legislation. In his Farewell Address, George Washington had recommended a “gradual increase in the navy.” Washington’s successor, John Adams’ mercantile New England roots inclined him to an even stronger pro-navy position. Adams believed that American prosperity rested on international trade and that protection of trade necessitated a strong navy.
As John Adams took the oath of office as the second president of the United States, the fallout from the French Revolution spread to enmesh and threaten the American republic. In France, the radical leftist Reign of Terror, evolved into the more conservative Directorate. Irregardless of the change in government, Republican France found itself locked in combat with monarchist England. In its plight, France expected reciprocal aid from the Unites States; it got none. Instead the pro-British Federalists first issued the Proclamation of Neutrality then negotiated Jay’s Treaty with England. Stung into outrage by this perceived perfidious behavior, the Directorate decided on a strategy meant to bring feckless America to its senses. The Directory incited a guerre de course, a war on commerce. French privateers roamed the seas in search of defenseless American merchant ships. They penetrated deep into American waters, even into New York harbor and Delaware Bay. In one year French privateers captured three hundred American ships with their cargo and crew. This depredation represented nearly 6% of the American merchant fleet. Imports and exports, especially at that vortex of international trade, the Caribbean, plummeted. Insurance rates, the telltale sign of commercial distress, skyrocketed from 6% to between 15% and 25%. Impotent, the United States government stood helpless.
On June 5, 1797, Congressman William Smith introduced ten resolutions to rectify American defenselessness. To protect American shipping these resolutions called for the completion and arming of the three frigates. On July 7, 1797, without significant Republican opposition, congressional navalists pushed through the Naval Armament Act of 1797. The act authorized the president: to complete, arm, and man the three frigates to defend American coastal waters; to employ existing Treasury Department ships for protective duty; to expend $200,000 to finish the frigates, and it included another $100,000 to man and supply them.
Sometimes action follows hard upon the heels of government decree, but not in the summer of 1797. Besides the Yellow Fever epidemic that paralyzed the shipyards of Philadelphia, other formidable obstacles stood in the way of an immediate American response. All of these obstacles centered about one focal point, the stunning incompetence of James McHenry. Supplies arrived in the wrong place or were never ordered. Captains and shipbuilders in three widely separated locations: Boston, Philadelphia, and Baltimore, wrote letters begging for assistance and supplies but got little. Armament for the ships proved most elusive. Angry and frustrated letters passed between Joshua Humphreys and iron foundries. Samuel Hughes’ foundry in Cecil, Maryland shipped fourteen 24-pound cannons to Humphreys, only to have them condemned as unfit when several of them exploded upon being tested. Rigging, supplying, arming, and manning proceeded haltingly and sporadically.
Although a whole year passed, Herculean human endeavor, reinforced by national resolve bore fruit. Ironically, none of the mighty frigates, but a lowly converted East Indiaman, the Ganges, sailed first, on May 24, 1797. Joshua Humphreys had refitted the Ganges and armed it with 24 cannons. From where Joshua Humphreys and Captain Richard Dale scrounged these precious weapons, the records are silent. As soon as the ship was refitted, armed, manned, and provisioned, Dale sailed down the Delaware River searching for French privateers, known to be lurking off the New Jersey cape. Then, he headed for the fishing grounds in the North Atlantic to protect the valuable and vulnerable American fishing fleet there. A month after the Ganges, a second ship, the Delaware commanded by Stephen Decatur, followed Dales’ ship to sea. Over the next two years, during the continuing conflict with France, the War department purchased or hired eleven other ships. For refitting or, at least, for inspection, most of these ships passes through Humphreys’ yard. But by the end of 1797, none of the frigates were yet ready for sea.
By the spring of 1798 relations between the United States and France had deteriorated even further. Even though preparing for defense, John Adams hoped for a diplomatic solution to the crisis. To negotiate a settlement, Adams had sent three Americans to meet with the French government. The infamous French demand for a bribe, the XYZ Affair, stiffened America determination to defend its honor. Since December 1797, John Adams had known about, but withheld, the report of the American commissioners in Paris. Rightly, Adams feared not only public outcry but also political pressure for war with France led by the Hamiltonian Federalists within his administration. Finally, on March 19,1798, after the content of the report had leaked, via Hamilton’s pipeline into Adams’ cabinet, James McHenry and Timothy Pickering, Adams formally presented the XYZ Report to Congress. Congress and the American public, “millions for defense, not one cent for tribute,” reacted immediately and angrily. If there is some deity that controls history he or she must have a peculiar and perverse sense of humor. Paradoxically, the French government succeeded where Joshua Humphreys, John Barry and other naval captains, the navalists in Congress, and the Federalists administration had failed. Indirectly, these French officials created the United States Navy and secured its future.
As early as January 1798 Congress had debated the creation of a separate department for the navy, and Josiah Parker’s House Committee on Naval Affairs had proposed an executive Committee on Marine. The proposal had attracted wide support, including Representative John Swanwick, a Federalist merchant from Philadelphia, who frequently voted Republican. Within ten days of his presentation of the XYZ dispatches, President Adams authorized the final expenditure, $115,833, needed to prepare the three frigates for sea. At this point, James McHenry, deluged by both naval and non-naval preparations for the expected conflict, stung by congressional inquiries, and, perhaps, aware of his own limitations, added his own recommendations to what the House Committee had already considered, the creation of a new, separate Department of the Navy. On April 30, 1798, John Adams signed an act passed by Congress thirteen days earlier, An Act to Establish an Executive Department to be Denominated the Department of the Navy. Enacting legislation to create a naval department proved far easier than finding someone to head it.
Among those considered to head the newly created Department of the Navy was Philadelphia shipbuilder, Joshua Humphreys. On April 28, 1798, the Philadelphia Federalists held a dinner celebrating the navy’s creation. Humphreys, the toastmaster, offered a toast, “The infant navy of the United States – Like the infant Hercules, may it even in its cradle strangle the serpents which would poison American glory.” Humphreys’ reputation as an ardent Federalist as well as the architect and builder of warships recommended him strongly for the appointment, but several obstacles stood in his way. When finished, the three frigates cost more than three times their original estimate. Watchful of the public purse and bruised by repeated Republican criticism, Adams and the navalist desperately needed a man of proven fiscal sobriety more than a respected and innovative shipbuilder. Also, Federalists needed someone who had administered a fleet of ships and had dealt with both sailors and sea captains. Humphreys possessed neither of these levels of financial or administrative experience. Humphreys had built many ships, but he had never guided or even sailed on one. One more factor. Several congressmen demanded that the Secretary of Navy must be a “gentleman” rather than an “artisan.” Edward Livingston (forgetting Benjamin Franklin) argued that a craftsman would feel uncomfortable and be reluctant to express himself among a council of his “better.” There is no record of Humphreys’ opinion on the matter. John Adams’ first choice as Secretary of the Navy was fellow New Englander, George Cabot. On May 11, 1798, Cabot, awash in his own mercantile affairs, politely but firmly declined the position. John Adams turned to his second choice, Benjamin Stoddert. Stoddert a Georgetown merchant and land speculator, whose own finances had suffered from his involvement with Robert Morris, initially declined Adams’ offer of the appointment. However, in the end Stoddert, motivated by strong patriotic feeling, relented and accepted the daunting task.
On June 18, 1798, John Adams administered the oath of office to the forty-seven year old Stoddert. Stoddert brought to the newly created Department of the Navy several vital talents. As a partner in an international mercantile firm with branches in Bordeaux and London, Stoddert possessed the ability to successfully man and supply large ships bound on lengthy voyages. He had acquired the skill of communicating clearly and directly without offending the Olympian self-image of sea captains. Although relatively young, Stoddert exhibited a mastery of military politics developed while he was a member of the Continental Board of War during the Revolution, but, at the same time, he stood clear of the political intrigue that marred Adams’ cabinet. In contrast to James McHenry, the new Secretary of Navy institutionalized a fiscal cost consciousness that blunted Republican criticism. At the same time, he astutely spread the federal largess into politically sensitive pockets. Historians of the origin of the United States Navy describe Stoddert as a “vigorous,” “imaginative,” “able,” and “energetic” administrator who labored “rapidly” to ready ships for sea.
By 1798, the President had already signed a bill that extended and redefined the navy’s mission. The law authorized American warships to capture French privateers and retake captured American vessels. In rapid succession, American warships, stirred to activity by Stoddert’s infectious drive, put to sea determined to protect American commerce and guard American coastal waters. By the end of June, the U.S. Constellation joined the Delaware and the Ganges on patrol in the Atlantic. At the beginning of July, the U.S. United States, provisioned and ready for sea, left her berth at New Castle, Delaware. Humphreys and Barry had painted the ship an aggressive yellow with black banded gunports. She carried a crew of five hundred seamen, marines, and officers and was armed to the teeth: thirty 24-pound cannons on her gun deck; fourteen 12 pounders on her spar deck; along with “a number of howitzers,” as well as smaller brass cannons called “chasers” mounted on the fore and aft rail. This impressive array of armament gave the frigate a throwweight, the total weight of all the cannon balls if all the cannons were fired simultaneously, nearly double any warship of similar size. Unfortunately, Barry had also added an alteration that adversely affected the ship’s speed and maneuverability. He constructed some kind of additional structure, described as a “roundhouse,” on the stern quarterdeck. Even so, Barry crowed about the ship: “No ship went to sea steers better and works better … she is equal, if not superior to any ship I ever saw I have seen nothing that I could with the greatest ease outsail.” By the end of 1798, fourteen America ships, including several revenue cutters with only one or two smaller cannons that were borrowed from the Treasury Department, prowled the sea or, more importantly, acted as protectors for convoys of merchant ships. By the end of 1799 the fleet of the United States Navy would grow to thirty ships. Although the United Sates Navy would later face cutback and retrenchment during subsequent Republican administration, its present looked bright, and its future, if somewhat tenuously, secured.
During the late spring and summer of 1798, as the ships of the growing U.S. Navy went to sea, Benjamin Stoddert began to evolve a coherent naval policy. Initially, reacting to nearly hysterical fears of an imminent French invasion as well as attempting to protect American trade, Stoddert divided the Atlantic coast into three areas and assigned each a frigate with, as they became available, smaller ships as consorts. He delegated the U.S. Constitution, the last to sail, to the waters off New England, from the very valuable Grand Banks (politically and economically important to the Adams’ administration) to Long Island. To the U.S. United States he allocated the middle area from Long Island to the Chesapeake, including the entrances to New York harbor and the Delaware River. The U.S. Constellation guarded from Cape Henry southward to the St. Mary’s River, Georgia, plus the ports of Charleston and Savannah. By July 1798, the fear of French invasion subsided, but American resistance stiffened as attacks on American ships on the high seas continued. On July 3, 1798, Congress passed another naval bill. This one permitted the Navy to seize French ships beyond American coastal waters. This act transformed naval policy from defensive to offensive. As conditions changed, Stoddert, always adaptive, reformulated and extended naval strategy. Considering his lack of background in naval warfare, Stoddert displayed a clear grasp of the tactics consistent with the new naval policy. On July 25, Stoddert ordered the United States, accompanied by the Delaware, to sail for the West Indies. Through the eighteenth century, the wealth of the Caribbean acted as a magnet for nations in conflict. Here, French privateers inflicted the greatest damage on American shipping. In addition to direct financial loss from the seizure of ships and cargoes, marine insurance rates for ships bound for the West Indies had risen to a prohibitive 30%. As a merchant, Stoddert understood insurance rates. From the initial two-ship presence, Stoddert evolved a squadron system. Again, he thought in geographical terms. Stoddert divided the Caribbean into two sectors, east and west, and stationed an American squadron that included one of the frigates and a detachment of smaller ships to each station. With the addition of a supplies-on-station system, this deployment enabled the U.S. Navy to maintain a permanent presence in the Caribbean, even during the dreaded hurricane season. By the fall of 1798, Benjamin Stoddert had brought to fruition what others had begun. A United States Navy with a small but growing fleet and a rational policy shouldered its way into the arena of the great naval powers.
Obviously, Benjamin Stoddert did not act alone. Others, especially Joshua Humphreys, the Philadelphia shipbuilder and innovative naval architect, played vital roles. If Humphreys harbored any ill-will after being snubbed for the office of Secretary of Navy in favor of the “gentleman” Benjamin Stoddert, his correspondence doesn’t reflect it. Much of the correspondence that passed between Joshua Humphreys and James McHenry had a why-isn’t-it-here-yet or how-do-you-expect-me-to-do-that tone. Humphreys’ letters to and from Stoddert have an entirely different resonance. Their correspondence reflects a mutual understanding and a personal and professional respect. Most of the letters in Humphreys’ letterbook from the summer of 1798 were addressed to “Benjamin Stoddert” or, more formally, to “The Secretary of the Navy.” Humphreys reported on several topics: the evaluation of ships that Stoddert proposed to purchase; the fitting out of the General Greene, and the completion and the sailing of two smaller ships, the Diligence and the Eagle. On at least one occasion, Stoddert and Humphreys jointly inspected the Herald, a ship which the navy had already purchased. They mutually agreed to condemn the ship and replace it with another, the Augusta. On another occasion, Humphreys passed to Stoddert a reported remark from an unidentified French passenger aboard a ship in the port of Philadelphia that “the spirited measures pursued by our government has had a good effect in that country (France), he is of the opinion we shall not have an open declaration of war with them.” This opinion proved to be prophetically accurate. On a third instance, Stoddert asked Humphreys to casually inspect and inquire about a suspiciously fast ship docked at a nearby wharf that was rumored to be a French privateer. In Benjamin Stoddert, Joshua Humphreys found a likeminded compatriot, a man who understood ships and how to construct and employ them.
Sparked by the demands of Stoddert and the new navy, Humphreys’ yard hummed with activity, but other old matters also required Humphreys’ attention and skills. Correspondence with two other members of the Adams’ administration, Oliver Wolcott, the Secretary of the Treasury, and Timothy Pickering, the Secretary of State, gives evidence of weighty matters. The frigate, Crescent, the tribute ship for the Dey of Algiers, along with two smaller ships neared completion. Pickering urged that the vessels be “made ready for sea as soon as possible.” Easier said than done. The demands of the three frigates and the other smaller warships had stripped all available sources of cannon and shot. Yet somehow, Humphreys acquired the arms and ammunition. In addition to the tribute ships, Humphreys had to locate and outfit another vessel, the brig Sophia, to sail with the Algerine ships to “bring home the officers … to bring back all their crew,” the officers and crew sailing the tribute ships to Algeria. While American and Algerine warships passed in and out of Humphreys’ yard, Oliver Wolcott requested Humphreys’ advice about the construction of revenue cutters, smaller ships, to enforce customs regulations in the shallow inlets of North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia. Initially, Wolcott suggested “contact some person familiar with inlets and harbors in North Carolina.” From gathering live oak for the construction of the frigates, Humphreys was well aware of the problem of southern harbors. Then, Wolcott offered Humphreys the contract “to build revenue(s?) for the North Carolina station” only. Finally, Wolcott gave Humphreys the entire task “Having this day to place the whole business … under your direction … I have this day directed the Collector of Philadelphia to furnish you the money to defray the expence [sic] of building and equipping the Revenue Cutters for Georgia and North Carolina.” On top of all this, James McHenry, still Secretary of War, requested that Humphreys recruit “a shipbuilder, carpenters, caulkers, and laborers to construct a galey [sic] in Pittsburgh for service on the Mississippi River.” In the extensive shipbuilding community of Philadelphia, Joshua Humphreys didn’t have to look far. His neighbor, another Southwark shipwright, Nathaniel Hutton, agreed to go with five other workers to construct the galley for the War Department. Size: 1444 tons; price: $431.89/per ton. Even though another, but less severe, bout of Yellow Fever struck Philadelphia in August and September, somehow, Humphreys met the demands of the entire Adams’ administration. One wonders if John Adams considered a jolly boat to row Abigail on the river, or if Alexander Hamilton considered a royal barge. The summer of 1798 brought two able, energetic, and farsighted men, Joshua Humphreys and Benjamin Stoddert, together. By the end of the year, reports of American successes against French privateers and warships rewarded their labors. Building upon these triumphs Humphreys, Stoddert, Adams, and the navalists in Congress unveiled an even more ambitious vision for the United States Navy.16
Notes on Chapter 4
1Clark, Gallant, pp. 386-387; Fowler, Jack Tar, 29, and Sternlicht, Constellation, 13.
2 Smelser, Congress, 127; Fowler, Jack Tar, 28; Letterbook, Vol. 2, Joshua Humphreys to Secretary of War, Oct. 4, 1797, and James B. Patrick and Richard e. Harding (eds.), U.S. Constitution: Old Ironsides (Little Compton, Rhode Island: Fort Church Publishing, 1991), 6.
3John H. Powell, Bring out your Dead: The Great Plague of Yellow Fever in Philadelphia in 1793 (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 282; Clark, Gallant, 388 and 389, and Letterbook, Vol. 2, Joshua Humphreys to Timothy Pickering, Sept. 25, 1797.
4Bauer, “Naval,” 30, Dauer, Adams, 108-140, and Symonds, Navalists, 66.
5Michael A. Palmer, Stoddert’s War: Naval Operations During the Quasi-War with France, 1798-1801(Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1987), 6.
6Symonds, Navalists, 57-58; O’Connor, Origins, 66, and Smelser, Congress, 117
7Clark, Gallant, 392-393.
8Bauer, “Naval,” 30; “Vessels in Humphreys Ms.” A typed list in folder headed: “IV Humphreys’ Shipyard,” ISM; Palmer, Stoddert’s, 19; Fowler, Jack Tar, 35, and Clark, Gallant, 393.
9Dauer, Adams, 137-141; Dauer severely criticizes Alexander Hamilton’s role in the creation of the U.S. Navy. Dauer argues that although Hamilton proposed completion of the frigates and arming of American ships as early as March 17, 1797, he was more interested in the provisional Army and that Hamilton’s interest in the army was an insult to Adams who favored the navy.
10Symonds, Navalist, 69-71; Fowler, Jack Tars, 37; Bauer, “Naval,” 30-31; Ferguson, Truxtun, 138; Smelser, Congress, 150-153; Palmer, Stoddert’s, 7; Symonds, Navalists, 72, and Clark, Gallant, 393.
11Gazette of the United States, April 28, 1798, as quoted in Smelser, Congress, 137; Carrig, John J. “Benjamin Stoddert, 18 June-31 March 1801” in American Secretaries of the Navy, 60, and Fowler, Jack Tars, 32.
12Sternlicht, Constellation, 21; Smelser, Congress, 157; Symonds, Navalists, 72; O’Connor, Origins, 67; Craig, “Benjamin Stoddert,” 61-62, and Palmer, Stoddert’s, 13-19.
13Letter, Sept. 19, 1798, John Barry to Joshua Humphrey, Correspondence, Vol. 1, 49; Smelser, Congress, 158 and 178-183; Sprout, Rise, 62; Sternlicht, Constellation, 26; Clark, Gallant, 412; Fowler, Jack Tar, 34-36; Dauer, Adams, 308; Bauer, “Naval,” 30; Gruppe, Frigates, 24; Ferguson, Truxtun, 138-140; O’Connor, Origins, 30; Clark, Gallant, 412, and Palmer, Stoddert’s. 19-21 and 31. Palmer repeats a story that the “roundhouse” was intended as living quarters for Mrs. Barry when the ship was in port. Why Mrs. Barry would have preferred to live on board a warship instead of the family estate, “Strawberry Hill,” which was less than five miles from the port of Philadelphia, Palmer doesn’t explain.
14Sternlicht, Constellation, 26; Smelser, Congress, 186; Fowler, Jack Tar, 36-42; O’Connor, Origins, 66, and Dauer, Adams, 150. Dauer cites an article in the Gazette of the United States as evidence of public alarm about a French army being assembled for an invasion of the United States. He also argues that this fear was deliberately stoked by the Federalist press.
15Ferguson, Truxtun, 176; Craig, “Benjamin Stoddert,” 16; Joshua Humphreys to Benjamin Stoddert, July 20, 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to Secretary of Navy, Sept. 16, 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to Benjamin Stoddert, Oct. 11, 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2, and Joshua Humphreys to Benjamin Stoddert, Nov. 16, 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2.
16Two letters: Joshua Humphreys to James McHenry, Sept. 1797 (and the second letter is undated), Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to Oliver Wolcott, June 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to the Secretary of State, Sept. 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to Secretary of Navy (no date), Letterbook, Vol. 2; Joshua Humphreys to Captain (?) Smith, Oct, 11, 1798, Letterbook, Vol. 2; Oliver Wolcott to Joshua Humphreys, May 25, 1798, Correspondence, Vol. 1, 51; Timothy Pickering to Joshua Humphreys, Oct. 22, 1798, Correspondence, Vol. 1, 52, and Timothy Pickering to Joshua Humphreys, Oct. 31, 1798, Correspondence, Vol. 1, 53.